CanKor - 9 September 2005

1. NORTH KOREA STANDS FAST ON NUCLEAR ENERGY USE

by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 9 September 2005

Two prominent experts on North Korea who recently made an unpublicized visit to the reclusive nation briefed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice yesterday as US negotiators prepared to return to Beijing for a renewal of six-nation disarmament talks.

China announced yesterday that the talks would resume next Tuesday, after a recess of more than five weeks after the participants were unable to reach agreement on a "statement of principles" that would guide negotiations to eliminate North Korea 's nuclear programs. Japan, South Korea and Russia are also participants in the talks.

John W. Lewis, a retired Stanford University professor, and Siegfried S. Hecker, retired director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, met with Rice yesterday afternoon to provide details of their talks with key North Korean officials, including the top negotiators for the North Korean side. The two men summarized their conversations in Pyongyang, made some suggestions for bridging gaps, and provided an assessment of the chances of reaching an agreement, according to one US official.

During the talks with Lewis and Hecker, North Korean officials made it clear that they intend to insist that the statement of principles acknowledge North Korea 's right to peaceful use of nuclear power, according to Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard, a former State Department Korea expert, who accompanied the two men. To varying degrees, South Korea, China and Russia have supported the North Korean position, while Japan has backed the US stance that North Korea 's behaviour gives it no right to even a peaceful program, except for research for medical, agricultural or industrial use.

"The North Koreans saw a chink in the armour," Pritchard said. "They have concluded this is a winning argument."

Pritchard said that as a result, any statement emerging from the talks appears less likely to be as clear and definitive as US officials had hoped. This in turn might drag out future negotiations.

To prod North Korea to return to the talks, Rice had declared that the United States recognized North Korea 's sovereignty. From the North Korean perspective, a sovereign nation has a right to peaceful nuclear energy, and one way the United States can demonstrate that it respects North Korea's sovereignty is to support that right.

North Korea 's position -- which also included a demand for a light-water reactor to compensate it for giving up its current nuclear facilities -- has led to sometimes heated discussions within the Bush administration over how to counter Pyongyang 's gambit, US officials said. Some officials, such as Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill, the chief US negotiator, have contended that the issue of whether North Korea has a theoretical right to peaceful nuclear energy is not as important as the main question of whether an agreement to eliminate North Korea 's nuclear programs can be reached in the first place. Moreover, even if North Korea wanted to build a civilian nuclear program, none of the countries at the table now would even be willing to fund it.

"The issue for some of the partners is whether.. . North Korea could then reclaim a right to nuclear energy," Hill said last month. "If you ask me, it's not exactly a showstopper issue -- the real issue is getting rid of all their nuclear programs."

But other officials have pushed back, saying that such a concession would allow the North Koreans to chip away at an agreement, especially if they managed to hide materials or programs not discovered during the verification process.

Some of the internal debate has centered on arcane and detailed discussion over various articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some argue that the first two articles support a theoretical right, but others argue that that hinges on compliance with the fourth article, which requires a country to live up to its obligations. North Korea has violated those obligations and withdrawn from the treaty.

Some conservatives in the administration, however, believe the administration has weakened its position in the North Korean talks by agreeing to support the European negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programs, and by quickly reaching a deal this year with India to supply it with civilian nuclear energy. Iran has violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and India never joined it.

*************************************************

2. KOREA WANTS DEVELOPMENT HELP OVER EMERGENCY FOOD AID

by Jae-Soon Chang, The Associated Press, Seoul, 9 September 2005

North Korea wants the World Food Program to shift the focus of its aid from food supplies to development projects that would help the communist nation feed itself, the UN aid agency said Friday. The nation of 23 million has received emergency food from the WFP and other international groups since natural disasters and mismanagement caused its economy to collapse in the mid-1990s.

A South Korean newspaper said the North has asked the WFP to leave the country. Gerald Bourke, a Beijing-based spokesman for the agency, denied the report in the Chosun Ilbo newspaper but said the North has told aid agencies it wants to review their status. The North is concerned about becoming dependent on aid and expressed "a preference for development assistance over emergency humanitarian assistance," he said.

He said the UN agency was in talks with the government about "the terms of what we hope to be a continued presence in the country."

"Very obviously there is considerable humanitarian need still in North Korea, " Bourke said.

The WFP tries to feed about 6.5 million North Koreans. Major donors include the United States, South Korea, Japan and China, which along with Russia are trying to negotiate an end to North Korea 's nuclear weapons program. Nearly $2 billion in food aid has flowed into the country over the last decade, according to a report by the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

On Thursday, President Bush's newly appointed envoy on human rights abuses in North Korea suggested future US food aid might be linked to liberating political prisoners.

"I think consistent with what the president's overall approach is on human rights, and bringing North Korea directly into the community of nations, we have to take a look at all different areas of our relationship," Jay Lefkowitz told a news conference.

In June, the United States decided to ship more than 50,000 tons of food to the North, saying the decision was based on humanitarian considerations alone and had nothing to do with efforts to get the North to disarm. State Department spokesman Tom Casey said later Thursday that Washington 's policy has not changed.

"We do not use food aid as a weapon. Decisions on such assistance are based on need and our ability to ensure that food will reach those for whom it is intended," Casey said.

*************************************************

FOCUS: Facts and arguments about humanitarian aid

*************************************************

3. ROK REFUTES REPORT ON LACK OF FOOD AID TRANSPARENCY

Ministry of Unification, Public Relations Policy Support, 2 September 2005

South Korea supported North Korea with 150,000 tons of rice in 1995. Due to continued suffering of North Korean citizens from the famine since then, South Korea has continued its humanitarian efforts. South Korea considers the fair distribution of food to needy North Korean citizens to be the most important goal.

Until now, the North and South Korean have continuously engaged in discussions to increase the transparency of food distribution. In order to ensure the fair distribution of food, the distribution site has been inspected and documented in the North-South Food Loan Agreement. South Korea has visited the distribution site and is confirming distribution status.

South Korea has consistently stressed that the equitable distribution of food must be confirmed in order for food support to continue. North Korea has cooperated and agreed in this regard. This year, the number of distribution sites being inspected and the number of inspections have increased in comparison to last year. As a result, there is better distribution transparency.

2000

Amount of Food: Rice – 300,000 T, Corn – 200,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 1
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Pyongyang

2002

Amount of Food: Rice – 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 1
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Nampo

2003

Amount of Food: Rice – 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 12
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Nampo, Chongjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, Haeju, Pyongyang

2004

Amount of Food: Rice – 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 10
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Kaesong, Kosong, Chongjin, Hamheong, Hamhong, Songrim

2005 (expected)

Amount of Food: Rice – 500,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 20
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Donghae-Ahn, Seohae-Ahn (**both are beach names which could indicate area names)

Therefore, Marcus Noland’s (the International Economic Institute’s Director) statement, that “ South Korea is unconditionally providing food support without distribution transparency” is untrue. In order to provide food to assist North Korean civilians, the South Korea will continue to strengthen transparency efforts.

With respect to Director Marcus Noland’s statement that “South Korea must provide food support to North Korea through the WFP,” South Korea has been providing rice to North Korea directly, and in addition, South Korea has also been providing food support to North Korea by participating with the WFP since 1996 in order to solve the famine situation in North Korea. Since 2001, South Korea has provided 100,000 tons of corn to North Korea annually through the WFP.

In 2003, South Korean food contribution comprised 20% of the WFP’s 512,000 tons of food; in 2004, the South Korean contribution comprised 27% of the WFP’s 368,000 tons of food. It appears that stating South Korea should provide its food support through the WFP ignores the benefits which direct support could have on progress of North-South relations, and the humanitarian efforts for North Korean civilians.

The Representative of the Unification Department

*************************************************

4. NOLAND AND HAGGARD DEFEND FOOD AID REPORT

by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 8 September 2005

[The following is a letter written by the authors of Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea, written by Prof. Stephan Haggard and Dr. Marcus Noland (see: http://www.hrnk.org/hunger/hungerReport05.pdf) to Mr. Han, Ki-Soo, Director, Cooperation Fund Division, Inter-Korean Economic & Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Unification, ROK in response to a refutation posted on the Ministry of Unification website (see item X above).]

Dear Mr. Han,

Thank you for your interest in our work. Be assured that we share with your government the earnest desire for reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and improvement in the human rights and material conditions of the North Korean people. We also believe sincerely that your government has made important contributions in this regard. Clearly, we should keep the central focus on the behavior of the North Korean government, not on our more peripheral disagreement with the Ministry of Unification about how best to achieve a commonly held purpose, namely ameliorating suffering in North Korea.

We are also thankful for the information that you have provided on your efforts with respect to your efforts at monitoring your relief program, although some of that information confirms, rather than allays, our concerns.

Unfortunately, your letter also contains a number of misrepresentations of our position. It is not clear to us that you read the full report, reviewed the transcript of our press conference, consulted with your embassy’s official who attended the press conference, or confirmed the alleged statements with us before posting your commentary. For your information, the report can be downloaded from the website of the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. We would also be happy to provide you with a printed copy.

First, we did not say that your government attaches no conditions to the aid it provides. We argued, rather, that the conditions for South Korea ’s assistance appear to fall short of the protocols that have been worked out over time between the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and the North Korean authorities.

It is our understanding based on a number of interviews with your colleagues at the Ministry of Unification (MOU), including those directly involved in the relief program, that to date the MOU has conducted no pre-implementation assessment of food needs in North Korea, and has issued no statement of the intended beneficiaries of its assistance or the plans for guaranteeing that such assistance will in fact reach the targeted beneficiaries.

Your letter notes the amount of grain donated, the “frequency of confirmation,“ and the monitoring areas. Both the number of monitoring visits by South Korean inspectors and the areas of monitoring fall far short of those conducted by the WFP. For example, you refer to 10 site visits in 2004 and a projected 20 visits for the aid you are to deliver in 2005. However, the WFP currently conducts 50 to 70 site visits per month, conducted by approximately 40 foreign staff, and these not only include public distribution centers but ports, food-for-work sites and the full range of institutions receiving assistance. Moreover, the quality of South Korean monitoring appears to fall short of WFP standards as well, as it involves long pre-notification periods of approximately one month potentially enabling North Korean authorities to disguise true conditions at sites designated for inspection. It is our understanding from our interviews with your colleagues that the South Korea does not audit of the disposition of its aid beyond visual confirmation that rice is indeed stored in the public distribution center under inspection, much less issue its own ration cards on the WFP model.

South Korean assistance also continues to be provided in the form of rice that is the preferred staple of the elite rather than less desirable grains such as barley or millet that would be less prone to diversion and therefore more likely to reach vulnerable portions of the population.

We should point out that we are not alone in noting the greater potential for diversion of South Korean aid; a number of South Korean NGOs and commentators have made the same points.

As our report makes clear, we are not interested in diversion per se, but rather in the effectiveness of the aid program. One way of evaluating effectiveness is through surveys of the nutritional status of the targeted populations. As you know, the United Nations organizations have now conducted several of these studies to indirectly assess the efficacy of their efforts. To our knowledge, the MOU has conducted no similar evaluation of the impact of its own program.

You note quite rightly that South Korea has been a generous donor to the WFP. However, the share of total South Korean assistance provided through the WFP has fallen over time as your total humanitarian assistance has gone up. We note that you do not provide details on the share of your assistance through the WFP.

Food aid may have had other beneficial political effects, such as facilitating meetings with North Korea. However, we believe it is a bad precedent for the international community to pay North Korea to fulfill its international obligations or to engage in dialogue. This strategy invites North Korea to withhold its cooperation for the purpose of being rewarded, as recent events clearly show. Moreover, these political benefits are offset by the potential that food aid is diverted to undeserving groups, including the military.

We should also point out that after we conducted interviews with your colleagues, we submitted a pre-publication draft of our report to them for comment and received no response.

Contrary to at least one erroneous press report, our belief is not that humanitarian assistance to North Korea should be cut, but that South Korea should bring its expertise on the country to bear by channeling a larger share of its assistance through the WFP. If South Korea were to do this, we believe that the humanitarian community as a whole would make much greater progress in guaranteeing that food aid is reaching its intended beneficiaries. We also believe that such a strategy would in no way impede your government’s efforts to conduct other forms of economic cooperation with North Korea.

We also note that your Ministry has apparently published a rebuttal to our report on your website without providing us the opportunity to respond. We would appreciate it if this letter were also posted. We are taking the liberty of publishing your letter on the Committee’s website along with this response, and will distribute our response to the South Korean press as well.

In conclusion, we believe that we share a common goal: that of alleviating hunger in North Korea, and a common belief that the international community should remain engaged in that effort. But we also believe that we should be honest with ourselves about the terms on which that effort proceeds.

Sincerely,

Stephan Haggard
Marcus Noland

*************************************************

5. EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE DPRK

by Erich Weingartner, Berlin, 16 June 2005

[The following are excerpts of a paper on Social Development Issues presented by CanKor Editor Erich Weingartner at the Stanley Foundation conference on the “Future Multilateral Cooperation With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Co-sponsored by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the conference was held 15-17 June in Berlin, Germany, bringing together representatives of involved governments, think tanks, and policymakers to discuss the opportunities and challenges for economic and social engagement with the DPRK in the event of a successful conclusion to the Six-Party Talks.]

EDUCATION
Education in the DPRK is free and universal. All children up to the age of 17 are enrolled in school. The adult literacy rate is 99 percent.

Despite the impressive accomplishments of the past, subject expertise and learning methods have not evolved in step with international standards. Over-emphasis on political education and enforcement of conformity has led to sub-standard academic achievements. The DPRK’s isolation and the extensive restrictions placed on means of communication (for example the Internet) have limited access to modern research and international academic networks.

Economic difficulties have resulted in shortages of textbooks and school supplies. Educational infrastructure is degrading rapidly. Inadequate heating in schools produce illness and absenteeism. Because of the excessively political nature of instruction, the international community will avoid major investment in this sector.

HEALTH
The DPRK guarantees universal and free health care. There are thousands of hospitals and clinics at the provincial, county and ri levels. There is a higher ratio of doctors to population than in China and Vietnam. Urban-rural disparities in access to health care are minimal.

Due to food shortages, the infant mortality rate has increased. Child deaths are caused by diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections (ARI), with malnutrition underlying half of these deaths. The 2004 Nutrition Assessment shows a steady improvement since 2002, but stunting and wasting remain high.

Tuberculosis increased almost 600% between 1994 and 2001. Malaria has re-emerged as a health concern, as has the more recent threat of avian influenza.

Severe and widespread shortage of basic equipment, a general degradation in the infrastructure, and the deterioration of water and sanitation systems have reduced the capacity of the health system to manage disease. Inpatient wards, operating theatres, emergency departments and delivery rooms lack heating in sub-zero winter temperatures. There is a shortage of even stethoscopes. Available equipment is often over thirty years old.

Rehabilitation of domestic pharmaceutical factories has been slow. The country is largely dependent on essential drugs provided by the WHO, UNICEF and the Red Cross Federation. The WHO supports skills upgrading among medical staff.

SOCIAL PROTECTION
Other aspects of the DPR Korean social security system are more difficult to document. The constitution, laws and policies guarantee a comprehensive set of social services, subsidies and safety nets.

Unfortunately, there is a dark side. Individual liberties are curtailed, and extremely harsh punishments are meted out for anti-social behaviour or disloyalty to the party or the leader. The economic hardships of recent years have led to an increasing number of migrants, refugees and defectors crossing into China, Russia and South Korea.

There is one particular human rights aspect that should be of concern in any discussion of social protection in the DPRK. Although the Juche socialist ideal promises a society of equals in which class oppression is eliminated, most evidence shows that social and political inequality is fostered in the DPRK. Refugee interviews reveal a society classified according to expected levels of loyalty and reliability to the regime. There is little chance of mobility. Class labels are inherited by succeeding generations. Since the state is the sole allocator of resources, inequalities are justified and perpetuated by the state's political and economic imperatives.

The DPRK's 2002 economic adjustments have not benefited all population groups equally. Government spending and social investments have not kept pace. One can assume that class ranking will have an impact on who benefits and who loses in the growing gap in income and standard of living.

Although the government committed itself to continue social services for 30 categories of recipients, it is doubtful that such a wide range of free services is sustainable. Many of them are already dependent on international assistance.

THINKING BEYOND THE EMERGENCY
Since regime stability has been identified as a prime motivating force in the DPRK, it may be wise to find a positive connection between human security and regime security. This is the more urgent in the wake of the DPRK’s declaration that it is a nuclear power.

Instead of demeaning the Juche idea as morally inferior, it may be psychologically expedient to link Juche with self-help strategies emphasizing education as a means to help Koreans solve their own problems.

Major emphasis should be placed on providing learning opportunities to expose DPR Koreans to the outside world. Education and training for economic modernization and integration into the global economy is an acute need, and will have direct impact on social development.

A number of agencies have formulated plans to improve the quality of the country's system of free and compulsory education. UNICEF provides textbooks and basic school supplies, including teaching material on child rights and HIV/AIDS, for example.

For the DPRK to exit from its chronic emergency, humanitarian assistance needs to be augmented by extensive development cooperation. Much greater emphasis needs to be placed on building the capacity for development, which will also increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

The DPRK needs to learn that its request for more technical assistance and development-oriented support will require an improved quality of interaction with the aid community: better transparency, better data and information, more policy dialogues, and a participatory approach to working partnerships.

Large-scale donors need to break out of the current political and ideological straitjacket that limits their involvement to the humanitarian sphere. Political constraints need to be removed and the benefits of development cooperation need to be highlighted. Education, health and social protection offer a variety of entry points for positive interaction between the DPRK and the international community.

Scarce resources, few external partners and the continuing humanitarian imperative limit the scope for large-scale interventions. The improvement of water and sanitation is a priority need, with pitiful resources. The return value in terms of health care alone is vast, with immediate benefit to all levels and classes in DPRK society.

Health service improvement has been a collaborative effort on the part of the World Health Organization, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and UNICEF. Although miserably under-funded, these agencies have made detailed plans, especially in relation to children and women. Included are immunization campaigns, training for health personnel and section doctors, production of manuals and appropriate supply of equipment. For the sake of sustainability, the country's capacity to produce the most essential drugs locally should be restored.

Until major donors see a way out of the current political and nuclear impasse, chances are that development activities will fail to find significant funding. This may be an ideal time for capacity building and pilot projects. County-level projects will provide valuable experience for planning larger-scale social development schemes once financing becomes available.

OPEN QUESTIONS
How can one ensure that the benefits of improvements in education, health and welfare reach all segments of society? This may be less of a problem if projects tackle large-scale infrastructure of the educational and health systems, such as schools, hospitals, water and sanitation, which by their nature will benefit all citizens. Is it possible for the DPRK to accept the notion that in a market environment, upward mobility replaces ideological motivation as the motor of industriousness, efficiency and innovation? What educational opportunities can be offered to DPRK policy makers for social welfare management in a market environment?

Is it possible to manage economic change in a way that does not erode social security? As the socialist origins of the DPRK health and education systems confront the realities of the emerging domestic and international markets, the social safety net for all levels and classes of society will have to be reinforced or realigned to ensure that the affected population has access to food and basic social services. Can international financial institutions avoid the mistakes of structural adjustment programmes that have devastated social protection in so many countries?

How can improvements in social justice be encouraged without being co-opted for “blame and shame” tactics in coercive diplomacy—as in the case of human rights? If multilateralism also means a division of labour, is the USA the most appropriate country to lead the way on human rights? After three years pushing human rights resolutions at the United Nations Commission of Human Rights, how do European sponsors evaluate the effectiveness of this procedure? Does an adversarial approach to human rights further the aim of persuading DPRK authorities to share information and statistics on social welfare indicators? Can the importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms be reframed as central elements both of economic development and the ultimate fulfilment of Juche ideals?

*************************************************

Contents: